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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, x 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 900222-CA 
v. : 
LINDA PETERSEN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a corrected judgment of conviction 
of manslaughter, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990), entered after a jury verdict finding 
appellant guilty of second degree murder, a first degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990).1 This court 
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
The judgment for a lower category of homicide was entered by the 
district court under the sentencing discretion provided for in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1990): "If the court, having 
regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of which 
the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character 
of the defendant, concludes that it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that category of offense 
established by statute and to sentence the defendant to an 
alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may, 
unless otherwise specifically provided by law, enter a judgment 
of conviction for the next lowest category of offense and impose 
sentence accordingly." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. In order to establish a prima facie case sufficient 
to survive appellant's motion to acquit, was the State required 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of self-defense? 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's 
determination that appellant's stabbing of her victim was not 
justified by self-defense? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether self-defense is an element of a prima 
facie case of second degree murder under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
203 (1990) is a question of law, see State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 
(Utah 1985), which this court reviews for correctness with no 
deference to the trial court. State v. Wilcox, 152 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 7, 8 (Utah Jan. 25, 1991). 
Issue 2: The jury's verdict must be sustained if there 
is any evidence, including reasonable inferences therefrom, from 
which findings of all the elements of the crime can be made 
without a reasonable doubt. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 289 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1837 (1990). In the 
context of the issue as presented in this appeal, the court must 
affirm appellant's conviction unless the evidence showing a lack 
of self-defense justification, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt about whether Appellant killed in self-
defense. See State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
see also State v. Puran, 772 P.2d 982, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Linda Petersen, was charged with second 
degree murder, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(b) or (c) (1990) (R. 22). At the close of the 
State's case-in-chief, her counsel made a motion for acquittal 
(Transcript 461-464), claiming that the defense need not go 
forward unless the State had proved the absence of self-defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The motion was denied (T. 469-71), 
and the defense went forward. 
Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder by 
the jury on March 16, 1990. At sentencing on April 18, 1990, the 
trial judge granted appellant's motion to reduce the conviction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990) to the next lower 
category of criminal homicide, manslaughter proscribed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990), and to impose sentence accordingly. 
This appeal is thus from a judgment of conviction for 
manslaughter, a second degree felony, for which appellant was 
sentenced to one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison (R. 
; Corrected Judgment and Commitment). Notice of appeal was 
filed on April 18, 1990 (R. 138), after final disposition of 
appellant's post-trial motions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Linda Petersen and Michel Bertrand lived together in 
her Layton, Utah home from January through May 1989, when he 
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moved out at her request, and again from early July through 
August 1989 during a period when they agreed to get back together 
(T. 565). There were problems in the relationship during this 
latter period: Petersen and Bertrand had discussed the 
possibility of him moving out again because he was not providing 
financial support or any kind of help to the household (T. 538). 
Betrand was upset by a custody and visitation dispute he was 
involved in (T. 531), and Petersen had decided he was using her 
to get back at his former wife (T. 569). 
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on September 1, 1989, 
Petersen was doing yardwork when Bertrand returned home with his 
four-year-old daughter, Tiffany, for a weekend visitation (T. 
535), his first in several months because of the custody dispute. 
Petersen finished her yard chores, and Bertrand took his daughter 
to the supermarket and brought back chicken and beer (T. 537). 
Petersen then took a bath while Bertrand put his daughter to bed 
by lying down with her; Petersen felt "crummy" because Bertrand 
did not come and talk to her before doing so (T. 537). 
Petersen went to the lower level of the split level 
home and began doing some work (T. 539). At about 11:00 p.m., 
Petersen called the home of her former boyfriend and talked to 
his eighteen-year-old son, Richie Toponce, sounding a "little bit 
upset" and not "in the best of moods" (T. 68). She told Richie 
she wanted to tell his father, who was not at home, the good news 
that she had joined the Navy reserves (T. 67). After the call, 
Petersen, who had been drinking (T. 75, T. 539), called a cab to 
take her to the Toponce residence in Sunset, Utah, where she knew 
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Richie was the only one home (T. 584), She left Bertrand a note 
(T. 539) on the kitchen counter telling him she "[w]ent to a 
friend's to party" (T. 260; Plaintiff's Ex, 22). Petersen then 
put some baby doll pajamas, her makeup, a backgammon board, a 
bottle of rum (T. 540), and a few cans of beer in a plastic 
grocery sack (T. 70) and went with her dog outside to sit on the 
steps and wait for the taxi (T. 541). 
Bertrand came out of the house, and Petersen told him 
o 
she was going to a friend's house (T. 581). He didn't want her 
to go, and he slapped her (T. 581), something he had never done 
3 
before (T. 543). She could not remember if she slapped him back 
(T. 582). The dispatched cabbie, Jay Sevy, drove by Petersen's 
home at about lis30 p.m. and saw a man slapping a woman who was 
trying to get away (T. 45). The cabbie drove past Petersen's 
house a half a block and then turned around and went back when he 
realized that his fare had called from the house where the fight 
was going on (T. 47). The couple was still there when Sevy 
stopped the cab in the middle of the street in front of the 
Petersen house (T.48). The man went up the stairs and into the 
house (T. 48). 
2 
Petersen was not sure if she told him it was an ex-boyfriend's 
house or just a friend's (T. 581). 
3 
According to Petersen, Bertrand had never done anything violent 
toward her (T. 532). On the other hand, Kay Olson, a friend who 
lived next door, had seen Petersen, agitated after one or two 
alcoholic drinks, turn and hit Bertrand and kick him in the 
groin, telling him to go into another room (T. 647). Petersen 
had, in her friend's estimation, a quick temper aggravated by 
alcohol (T. 651). 
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Sevy helped Petersen get her dog and her sack of 
belongings into the cab (T. 51). Her hair was in disarray and 
her face was puffed up like she'd been crying (T. 52). She 
opened a can of beer from out of her sack and then threw it away 
when Sevy insisted (T. 51). 
The cab arrived at the Toponce residence at about 11:45 
p.m. (T. 69), and Petersen took her dog and belongings inside and 
paid Sevy with a check (T. 52). She did not say anything to 
Richie about problems at home (T. 71). She sat down and watched 
television with him, and then they began playing backgammon and 
drinking rum and cokes for the next 2h to 3 hours (T. 71-72; 
546). About halfway through the first backgammon game, Petersen 
left the room and made a phone call. At first Richie could not 
hear well enough to understand what Petersen was saying, but as 
her voice got louder and more argumentative he heard her say she 
wanted the person on the other end (who Richie assumed was her 
boyfriend) to leave and leave the house keys on the table or 
counter (T. 72-73; 88-90). She returned to the living room area 
and told Richie she was tired of Bertrand freeloading off of her 
(T. 73). 
During the next two hours, Petersen and Richie played 
backgammon and drank the bottle of rum, becoming quite drunk (T. 
74-75; T. 546). Petersen went into one of the bedrooms and 
emerged in her baby doll pajamas and eventually she and Richie 
engaged in sexual intercourse (T. 77). Some time afterwards, 
Petersen began to feel sick and Richie fetched a bucket (T. 77). 
At approximately 3:00-3:30 a.m., she asked him to call a cab to 
- f i -
•take her home (T. 77). She got her clothes back on and fell 
asleep on the couch. 
When the cabbie, Dean Steeley, arrived about twenty 
minutes later, Richie answered the door and then went and woke up 
Petersen (T. 101), who was "pretty drunk" (T. 79). He wrote out 
her check for her, which she signed (T. 78). Then she grabbed 
her dog and a sack and the backgammon board (T. 101) and went out 
to the cab. She told Steeley where to go in Layton and 
expressed no concerns about returning there (T. 103). When they 
arrived at her house, she asked Steeley to come in and she would 
give him the check (T. 104). 
Steeley accompanied Petersen into the house and sat 
down on a stool in the upper level kitchen (T. 105). Bertrand 
came walking down the hallway toward the kitchen in his underwear 
and asked Petersen in a jealous way, "Who's this, your new fuck?" 
(T. 145), to which Steeley replied that he was only a cab driver 
(T. 106). Bertrand's question made Petersen angry because it was 
disrespectful (T. 590), and she retorted, "I don't have to take 
this shit. Get out." (T. 147), to which Bertrand responded 
something like "Okay, I will. You let me get my little girl." 
(T- 147). 
Petersen went down the hallway toward the bedrooms and 
Bertrand followed her out of Steeley's sight (T. 107; 147). 
Steeley heard a crashing sound like pictures falling (T. 108) and 
then heard choking and gasping sounds (T.149) and the following 
exchange: 
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Woman: "Don't choke me.•• 
Man: "I wouldn't choke you if you didn't 
bite me.•• 
Woman: "I wouldn't bite you if you didn't 
choke me.•• 
(T. 149). Petersen then came down the hallway toward Steeley and 
grabbed the telephone on the kitchen wall (T. 110) and called the 
Layton City Police Department. She asked Steeley to stay until 
police arrived (T. Ill)/ and then had the following conversation 
with the dispatcher at 4:22 a.m.: 
Dispatcher: Layton City Emergency. 
Peterson: Yes, I would like to 
Dispatcher: What's the problem? 
Peterson: 
right now. 
Uh, let's put it this way, a, uh, domestic 
problems. 
Dispatcher: OK. Where at? 
Peterson: 1178 West 2525 North. 
Dispatcher: OK. And where's—is this where the 
problem's at? 
Peterson: 
Dispatcher: 
Peterson: 
Yes it is. 
OK. And who is it between? 
It's between two people who aren't 
married. Linda Peterson who is a home 
owner and Mitch Bertrand. 
Dispatcher: OK. Is it two females? 
Peterson: No. 
Dispatcher: I'm sorry. OK. 
Peterson: Two females—I wish. 
Dispatcher: OK. Is this at your home? 
Peterson: Yes it is. 
Dispatcher: OK. And who—I'm sorry—give me the names 
of the people again. 
- f t -
Peterson: My name is Linda Peterson. I am a 
homeowner. 
Dispatcher: OK, and what's the problem? 
Peterson: He's gonna get his ass out of here real 
quick. 
Dispatcher: Ok. Who's—what's the guy's name? 
Peterson: Mitch Bertrand. 
Dispatcher: Burton? 
Peterson: Bertrand. B-E-R-T-R-A-N-D. 
Dispatcher: OK. And is this a boyfriend of yours or 
an ex-husband, or— 
Peterson: It's a boyfriend. 
Dispatcher: OK. And you don't want him there, is that 
it? 
Peterson: No. 
Dispatcher: OK, uh— 
Peterson: I'm gettin' tired of gettin' choked to 
death and shit, you know. 
Dispatcher: OK. So he has assaulted you then? 
Peterson: Yes he has. 
Dispatcher: OK. Is he still there now? 
Peterson: Yes he is. 
Dispatcher: Any alcohol or weapons involved? 
Peterson: I have no idea. 
Dispatcher: What do you mean you have no idea? I 
have— 
Peterson: — I don't know if he's drank or not. 
Dispatcher: Have you been drinking? 
Peterson: Yeah. 
Dispatcher: OK. Umm, you—so he hasn't assaulted you 
with anything, but rather than—with all 
the— (unintelligible) 
Peterson: He chokes me to death, honey. 
Dispatcher: OK. Well, I just need this to find out 
for the officer's safety. 
Peterson: OK. 
Dispatcher: Umm, does he have a vehicle there? 
Peterson: Yes he does. 
Dispatcher: OK, umm, did he have a place to stay 
tonight, or — 
Peterson: I have no idea and I don't fuckin' care. 
Dispatcher: OK. OK, well we'll send an officer over. 
Peterson: Thank you. 
Dispatcher: OK, bye-bye. 
End of tape. The time is 4:24. 
4 (R. 3-5; Plaintiff's Ex. 26). When Petersen hung up the phone, 
Bertrand, who had gotten dressed, came down the hallway with a 
box of toys in his arms on his way downstairs and asked Steeley 
if he would mind moving the cab out of the driveway (T. 111-12; 
597). According to Steeley, his tone "wasn't real mellow, but it 
wasn't real loud" (T. 113). Petersen saw Bertrand go and start 
packing and taking his things out of the house (T. 552), and she 
thought he had come out with clothes on a hanger (T. 595-96). At 
that point, Petersen believed Bertrand was leaving (T. 597). 
Steeley walked down one flight of steps to the front 
door landing and went outside to move the cab, closing the door 
The tape recording of this conversation was played for the jury 
(T. 198; Plaintiff's Ex. 25). 
-in. 
behind him. Petersen said she went downstairs at this point to 
make sure that Bertrand wasn't packing up her possessions from 
the family room (T. 553). When Steeley returned to the front 
door and knocked two to three minutes later (T. 116; 153), he 
heard the sound of toys crashing and screaming (T. 117). 
Petersen subsequently told her neighbor she had either kicked or 
knocked the box of toys out of Bertrand's hands as he was 
5 
bringing it downstairs (T. 644). 
When Steeley opened the front door and went in, there 
were toys scattered on the landing, as well as on the steps down 
to the garage and family room area and the steps up to the 
kitchen and bedroom area (T. 153). He saw Petersen and Bertrand 
fighting at the bottom of the lower set of steps (T. 154). 
Bertrand had her by the hair and hit the side of her head into 
the wall (T. 118), while shaking her (T. 120), calling her a 
whore and a slut (T. 118; 155), and hollering two or three times, 
"Get her off of me" (T. 120). Petersen broke away and got one or 
two steps up, when Bertrand grabbed her by the hair and banged 
her head five or six times against the front door, which was 
pushed open against the wall, while again screaming "Get her off 
of me." (T. 120-21). Steeley did not physically intervene 
(T.181), although he was standing just outside the doorway, but 
told Bertrand to let her go (T. 181). Meanwhile, Petersen was 
slapping Bertrand (T. 178; 180) and yelling, "Let me go" (T. 
121). 
Steeley also told police during their investigation that the 
box of toys had been knocked out of Bertrand's hands (T. 184). 
Petersen testified at trial, however, that Bertrand had dropped 
Bertrand then released Petersen (T. 121; 158), and she 
ran past Steeley and upstairs (T. 122), Bertrand walked down a 
few steps and and stood at the bottom of the lower steps, an area 
that was "kind of dark" (T. 122) and "real dim" (T. 159). He 
began picking up the scattered toys (T. 181; 191; 600). Petersen 
went into the kitchen and grabbed a kitchen knife with a 12 cm 
(5") blade (T. 364, 605; R. 7). Petersen returned quickly to the 
top flight of stairs and leaned over the railing to the basement 
area, waving or lunging with the knife (T. 163; 185) "to threaten 
him, to tell him to get out of there now" (T. 606), though she 
did not see Bertrand (T. 606). She continued down .the first 
flight of steps, "shooting by" Steeley (T. 159; 164; 188) "pretty 
fast" (T. 124), while yelling "Get out" (T. 124; 163) and 
holding the knife in front of her in her right hand (T. 161; 
187) . 
Petersen continued down the lower flight of stairs with 
her back to Steeley (T. 167; 187), who could not really see the 
area at the bottom of the stairs very clearly (T. 125; 159). 
When Petersen reached the third or fourth step down from the 
landing, Steeley saw a shadow come around the corner at the 
bottom of the lower stairs in an upright position (T. 126; 166), 
and then heard the following exchange as he started down the 
stairs (T. 127): 
Bertrand: "Oh God, she stabbed me." 
Petersen: "Now leave." 
Bertrand: "I can't drive." (T.168). 
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Bertrand fell to the floor and Steeley picked up the 
knife at his feet (T. 128; 168) and took it upstairs and put it 
in the kitchen sink. Steeley went back downstairs and put a 
washcloth on Bertrand's hand because he saw blood there and then 
put a towel on Bertrand's chest when he saw a trickle of blood 
there (T. 129). 
Steeley then heard the truck door opening in the garage 
and heard a little girl calling "Daddy" (T. 129). Steeley went 
out into the garage and stayed with the four-year-old there until 
the police arrived moments later (T. 131). 
Officer John Libbert, responding to the Layton City 
police dispatch, walked up the driveway and saw the garage door 
open and Bertrand's pickup truck, with the tailgate down and 
personal belongings in the truck bed (T. 205; 207). He 
approached Steeley, who said, "There's a real weird situation 
here." (T. 208). Officer Libbert heard a woman's loud voice 
coming from inside the house, but could not understand the loud 
speech (T. 208-09). Then Petersen walked out of the lower level 
of the house into the garage, wearing blood-spattered sweatpants 
and carrying a can of beer in her right hand (T. 209; 133). 
Her balance was poor, her speech was slurred (T. 209; 639), and 
she did not seem upset (T. 252 639); she took a drink from her 
beer as she emerged from the house (T. 209; 639). 
Although Petersen claimed to not remember getting the beer 
after the stabbing, she admitted that to do so she would have had 
to walk by Bertrand#s body, go over to the refrigerator in the 
family room, and then walk by the body again to enter the garage 
(T. 614-615). 
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Petersen gave her name to the officer and, when asked 
what the problem was, said, "He was choking me and I had to 
defend myself. . . . I did it in self-defense" (T. 209-210), 
which she repeated several times before her arrest (T. 237). 
Libbert looked at Petersen's neck and saw no redness; he looked 
at her face and saw no injuries (T. 248). 
Libbert then looked through the open door into the 
lower level of the house and saw a body. He asked Petersen what 
she had done in self-defense and she stated she had used a knife 
and stabbed him, at the same time making an overhand motion with 
her left hand (she was still holding the beer in her right hand) 
(T. 211). Officer Libbert called for police and medical backup 
and went to examine the body at the bottom of the inside stairs, 
finding a stab wound in the chest and no vital signs (T. 212). 
He saw toys scattered under and around Bertrand's body and on the 
landing (T. 218). He found blood on the stairwell wall above the 
second or third step from the bottom of the lower flight of 
stairs (T. 229-230; 242). 
As Libbert came back out into the garage, he asked 
Petersen who else was in the home besides her and the victim and 
the little girl. Petersen responded that her dog was there and 
sarcastically asked the officer, "Do you want to talk to the 
fucking dog?" (T. 213). Libbert then instructed her to put her 
beer on the trunk of the car in the garage, and he arrested her. 
(T. 214). She asked if Bertrand was dead, and Libbert said yes, 
which she seemed to comprehend (T. 251; 641). 
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During transport to the police station, Petersen told 
Officer Dale Bowker that she and Bertrand had had a fight and he 
pushed her around and tried to choke her to death (T. 285). She 
smelled strongly of alcohol and her eyes were bloodshot, but she 
seemed coherent (T. 279). Bowker saw no injuries on Petersen, no 
redness or markings on her neck, but her hair was messed up (T. 
280; 293). She repeated that she had stabbed him and that she 
had had to defend herself (T. 286-87), and she expressed no 
concern for the victim (T. 293). As he placed her in the holding 
room at the police station, "she didn't really seeem bothered by 
the fact that somebody had been stabbed." (T. 279). 
When he returned to the holding room to interview her 
sometime later, Petersen complained of chest pains and was 
hyperventilating (T. 298-99). She was taken by ambulance to a 
hospital emergency room and examined by Dr. Allen Condie at 6:45 
a.m. (T. 443). Dr. Condie had her breathe into a paper bag and 
then into a non-rebreathing mask as treatment for her 
hyperventilation, which he diagnosed as being caused by emotional 
upset and not physical injury (T. 443; 446). He gave her 10 mg 
of Valium, and her breathing returned to normal in 15-20 minutes 
(T. 445). Dr. Condie did a full head-to-toe physical examination 
of Petersen and found no significant trauma (T. 445). He found 
no red marks, lacerations, abrasions, or bruises on her neck, 
chest, back or anywhere on her body, as well as no swelling on 
her head, which would be expected unless the trauma was minor (T. 
445-47). At 7:30 a.m., he came back and asked Petersen if she 
hurt anywhere, and she said no (T. 447). He did another complete 
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examination of her body at that time and the results were the 
7 
same (T. 447; 445). After Petersen dressed, Officer Bowker 
took a photograph of her face and neck (Plaintiff's Ex. 2) and 
specifically looked at her face, neck and head. The only injury 
he saw there was a very small puncture wound under the left ear 
lobe that matched up with the post hole of Petersen's earring 
(T. 302). 
Dr. Todd Grey, the medical examiner who performed the 
autopsy on Bertrand, described him as being 6' tall, 140 lbs., 
and of slender build (T. 369). Dr. Grey found two sharp force 
injuries, which are those made by a sharp-edged or cutting type 
of instrument (T. 347). The first was the lethal stabbing injury 
(T. 364). In creating the 5 V deep stab wound (T. 361), the 
knife blade had first gone through Bertrand's sternum, struck his 
heart sack, passed through the right ventricle, exited the back 
of the heart, and completely severed his esophagus (T. 357). The 
wound path was slightly downwards and slightly right to left 
through the breast bone. Dr. Grey testified it would take a 
significant amount of force to drive a blade through a bone like 
that (T.362), which a 5', 103 lb. woman was capable of exerting 
"if she put energy into the blow" (T. 371). 
Petersen's personal physician, Dr. Charles Berwald, testified 
for the defense about an examination of her on September 6, four 
days after the stabbing. He found one abrasion, 1 cm in length, 
along her front hairline and six bruises, 1-3 cm x 1-4 cm in 
size, none of which were on the sides or back of her head (T. 
517). Dr. Berwald admitted, however, that the bruises could have 
been inflicted as recently as 24 to 48 hours before his 
examination of Petersen (T. 520). 
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Dr. Grey examined the sweatshirt and pants Petersen was 
wearing at the time of the stabbing (Plaintiff's Ex.23) and found 
several small droplets of blood on the left arm of the shirt and 
a small area of smeared blood on the right shirt arm (T. 367). 
On the sweatpants, there was an extensive pattern of unsmeared 
droplets of blood that had struck the front of the pant legs and 
the groin area at a downward angle (T.368). 
Dr. Grey found the injury to Bertrand, the wound path, 
and the blood spatter pattern consistent with a scenario in which 
a 5'1" person with the knife was above the 6' victim on the 
stairs and made a thrusting forward motion (T. 370-72). However, 
he found those same facts inconsistent with a scenario in which 
the knife holder was stationary and the victim ran into the knife 
and impaled himself (T. 373-74). First, it would be very 
difficult to hold the knife tightly and steadily enough to travel 
as it did, given the amount of force the victim would have had to 
exert against the knife for it to go through the sternum; the arm 
in which the knife was held would be knocked away and the 
person's grip on the knife lost (T. 374). Secondly, because of 
the momentum that would be necessary in order to impale on the 
knife, the victim would continue falling forward onto the person 
with the knife, creating a smeared, irregular blood pattern on 
the latter's clothing, which was not present here (T. 374; 388-
89). Dr. Grey concluded that the knife was driven into 
Bertrand's body, instead of the body being driven onto the knife 
blade (T. 407). 
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Jim Bell, an experienced blood stain analyst, described 
the blood droplet pattern on Petersen's clothes as uniform and 
unsmeared (T. 416), the result of the victim's arterial blood 
spurting out in an arc and dropping on the clothing at a slight 
angle (T. 417-18). Bell agreed with Dr. Grey that there would 
have been contact between Bertrand and Petersen if he had impaled 
himself on the knife because he would have continued moving 
forward from his momentum even after impalement (T. 421-23). 
There was no such contact, Bell determined, because contact would 
have unquestionably produced a large amount of heavy blood 
smearing on the front of Petersen's sweatpants (T. 422-23). 
Bell also concluded Bertrand could not have come around a corner 
fast enough and hard enough, then up one or two stairs, to impale 
himself on the 5" knife blade because of the force that would be 
needed to penetrate the sternum (T. 423), as well as the absence 
of smeared blood on Petersen's clothing (T. 421). 
In addition to the stab wound that killed Bertrand, Dr. 
Grey also found a second sharp force injury: fresh sharp-edged 
cut wounds, caused by a knife or something similar (T. 393), on 
the backs of his right index finger and right middle finger (T. 
353; Plaintiff's Ex. 33) and a superficial cut on the back of the 
right elbow (T. 349). Grey described these as defensive wounds, 
i.e., those that look like they were sustained by the victim in 
an attempt to ward off or protect himself from attack (T. 355). 
In addition, the autopsy revealed fresh abrasions on two of 
Bertrand's fingers, abrasion and bruising on the back of his 
right elbow, a bruise on the upper left side of his abdomen, 
-18-
small scrapes on his left cheek and left arm, and a fresh bite 
mark on his right forearm (T. 349-50). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied appellant's motion to 
acquit at the close of the State's case-in-chief. At that point, 
the State was only required to establish a prima facie case by 
putting forth some evidence of every element of its cause of 
action. Case law clearly holds that the State need not prove the 
absence of self-defense as part of its prima facie case of 
homicide. 
The court should decline to reach the merits of 
appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the jury's determination that she did not act in self-
defense in stabbing Bertrand. Appellant has failed to marshall 
all the evidence supportive of that determination and has not 
demonstrated why that evidence, even if viewed in a light 
favorable to the jury's verdict, is insufficient. 
If the court chooses to reach the merits of appellant's 
claim of insufficient evidence, there was ample evidence from 
which the jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
appellant's stabbing of Bertrand was not justified by self-
defense. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LACK OF SELF-DEFENSE IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF A 
PRIMA FACIE CASE OF HOMICIDE WHICH THE 
PROSECUTION HAD TO ESTABLISH IN ITS CASE-IN-
CHIEF IN ORDER TO SURVIVE APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO ACQUIT 
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her 
motion for acquittal at the close of the State's case-in-chief 
because the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that she had not acted in self-defense (Brief of Appellant at 19-
20). 
A motion for acquittal is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 
77-17-3 (1990), which requires discharge of a criminal defendant 
"[w]hen it appears to the court that there is riot sufficient 
evidence to put a defendant to his defense," and Utah R. Crim. P. 
17(o): 
At the conclusion of the evidence by the 
prosecution . . . the court may issue an 
order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the 
ground that the evidence is not legally 
sufficient to establish the offense charged 
therein or any lesser included offense. 
These provisions arise from the basic notion that a defendant 
need not go forward with any evidence in his or her defense 
unless the prosecution first presents a prima facie case, i.e., 
some evidence of every element of the crime charged or a lesser 
included offense. State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976); State v. Strieby, 
790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Evidence sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case need only conform to the statutory 
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definition of the crime charged, Romero, 554 P.2d at 217, and the 
elements of the crime consist of "(a) conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct; and (b) the requisite 
mental state." Id.; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(2) (1990); see 
also State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985). 
Appellant was charged with second degree murder, a 
criminal homicide in which the actor 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another, . . . commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death 
of another; [or] 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a 
depraved indifference to human life, . . . 
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk 
of death to another and thereby causes the 
death of another[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (1990). The statute sets forth the 
prohibited conduct, its results, and the requisite intent as the 
elements of the crime the State must establish as its prima facie 
case. Appellant does not dispute that the State in this case 
presented "some evidence" of each statutory element of second 
degree murder; rather, she contends that the absence of self-
defense was an additional element of the crime charged that the 
State was required to, but failed to, prove in its case-in-chief. 
In State v. Knollf 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985), the 
defendant argued that Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (Supp. 1982), by 
describing criminal homicide as an "unlawful" killing, made the 
absence of self-defense an element of the crime of manslaughter, 
one category of homicide. Noting that self-defense is a 
justification for a killing, the Utah Supreme Court rejected this 
argument and held that the absence of self-defense is not one of 
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the prima facie elements of homicide. Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. 
Accordingly, it is not an element that must be proved by the 
State in order to survive a motion for acquittal at the close of 
the State's evidence in a homicide prosecution, as this court 
recently held in State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d at 100. Otherwise, 
the State would be forced "to prove a negative in a homicide 
offense, a burden the law does not often impose." Knoll, 712 
P.2d at 214; accord Strieby, 790 P.2d at 100 n.l. 
Appellant attempts to distinguish Strieby by contending 
that self-defense was not "raised" by the State's case-in-chief 
against Strieby. If it had been, Appellant suggests, the court 
would have held that the State was required to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt, as part of its prima facie case, that Strieby 
did not act in self-defense (Br. of App. at 19-20). This is a 
misreading of the clear holdings of Knoll and Strieby, noted 
above. Although Knoll requires the jury to be instructed on the 
issue of self-defense and requires the State to prove its 
absence beyond a reasonable doubt once the issue has been raised 
by the evidence presented at trial, Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215, it is 
simply inappropriate to test the sufficiency of the State's 
evidence on this point in a motion to acquit at the close of the 
g 
The description of criminal homicide no longer refers to an 
"unlawful" killings 
A person commits criminal homicide if he 
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with 
criminal negligence, or acting with a mental 
state otherwise specified in the statute 
defining the offense, causes the death of 
another . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (1990). 
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State's case-in-chief. Furthermore, Appellant's argument 
mischaracterizes the evidence before the trial court at the time 
of Strieby's motion to acquit. As this court pointed out in its 
opinion, Strieby admitted to causing the death of her husband. 
790 P.2d at 100. Thus, the only disputed issue at trial was 
whether that action was justified by self-defense. Defendant 
Strieby's version of what happened, namely, that she had shot him 
in self-defense, was raised in the prosecution's case-in-chief by 
the admission of State's exhibit 14, a transcription of the 
recorded statement she gave to the police describing the events 
leading up to the shooting, including the beatings she was 
subjected to (Record on Appeal in State v. Strieby, No. 890124-
CA, at 136, cited in Brief of Appellee State of Utah at 4-6). 
In short, the law clearly does not require the State to 
prove a lack of self-defense as part of its prima facie homicide 
case before a defendant is put to her proof, even if there is 
some evidence in the State's case-in-chief raising the issue of 
self-defense. See Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. At this point in the 
proceeding, the State was only required to present some 
If Appellant had moved for a directed verdict after the defense 
rested, the trial court would then have had to determine if there 
was sufficient evidence warranting sending the case to the jury. 
See State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). Because 
the State must prove the absence of self-defense once the issue 
is raised, Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214, the trial court would then 
have had to determine if there was some evidence presented from 
which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Appellant had not acted in self-defense. Whether a killing was 
justified by self-defense is for the jury's determination, unless 
the evidence of it is so compelling that all reasonable minds 
must conclude that the means and force used were reasonably 
necessary to defend against imminent serious bodily injury. 
State v. Lawf 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324, 327 (1944). 
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believable evidence of each statutory element of the crime with 
which appellant was charged, or of a lesser included offense. 
Because the State was not required to prove a lack of self-
defense in order to make out its prima facie homicide case, the 
trial court properly denied appellant's motion to acquit. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER 
APPELLANT'S INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM BECAUSE SHE 
HAS NEITHER MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
A LACK OF SELF-DEFENSE NOR DEMONSTRATED ITS 
INSUFFICIENCY AS A MATTER OF LAW 
In State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 32 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), issued two months before the filing of -Appellant's 
brief, this court expressly adopted for criminal appeals of jury 
verdicts the "marshaling" requirement theretofore applied to 
civil appeals and criminal bench trials. After Moore, a criminal 
defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
a jury's verict of guilty must marshal all of the evidence that 
supports the jury's findings and then demonstrate that, even 
viewing it in the light most favorable to the jury's decision, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's findings. Id. 
The court explained its reasons for adopting this rule: 
The process of marshaling the evidence 
serves the important function of reminding 
litigants and appellate courts of the broad 
deference owed to the fact finder at trial. 
Such deference is especially appropriate 
where the fact finder is a jury, whose common 
sense is a valued buffer between the parties. 
. . • Marshaling also aids the appellate 
courts in deliberations and in the opinion-
writing process. 
Id. 
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Requiring a defendant convicted by a jury to marshal 
the evidence supporting the jury's determination of guilt is a 
necessary concomitant of the appellate courts' limited power to 
review jury verdicts. See id. at 31. The applicable standard of 
review in such cases requires an appellate court to view all the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 
1837 (1990); Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. In order to do so, 
the court must have all of that evidence presented to it as its 
starting point for appellate review. A defendant who fails to 
marshal all of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict gives 
the appellate court an incomplete picture of the evidence before 
the jury, one that is inappropriately skewed to favor what 
defendant believes the jury should have found, not what it did 
find. In such a circumstance, the appellate court is being asked 
by a convicted defendant to overrule a jury decision reached 
after taking into account evidence of which the appellate court 
is kept ignorant by the defendant. Furthermore, a defendant who 
fails to fulfill the Moore marshaling burden merely foists that 
considerable task onto the appellate court or the State. 
This case presents a prototypical example of the kind 
of insufficiency argument the rule adopted in Moore is designed 
to preclude. In her brief, Appellant selectively extracts 
testimony from a 700-page trial transcript that she claims should 
have led to a finding that she was justified in killing Michel 
Bertrand. Although the jury in this case, after more than eight 
hours of deliberations, determined that Appellant did not stab 
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Bertrand in self-defense, Appellant reargues her version of the 
evidence to this court, asking it to be a super-jury and reach 
the opposite conclusion. However, as this court reiterated in 
Moore, it is not the appellate court's function to act as a trial 
court. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32. "The jury, not the 
appellate court, weighs the evidence and assesses witness 
credibility; so long as some evidence and reasonable inferences 
support the jury's findings, we will not disturb them." Id. 
The standard of review applicable to insufficiency 
claims requires this court to look at all the evidence that 
supports the jury's determination that Appellant's killing of 
Bertrand was not justified by self-defense. Appellant has 
nonetheless failed to present all of that evidence to the court. 
If the rule adopted in Moore is to have any teeth in it, it 
should be enforced in this case to preclude consideration on 
appeal of Appellant's insufficiency argument. 
POINT III 
IF REACHED, THE COURT SHOULD REJECT 
APPELLANT'S INSUFFICIENCY CLAIM BECAUSE THERE 
IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A JURY 
COULD HAVE CONCLUDED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT APPELLANT'S KILLING OF BERTRAND 
WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY SELF-DEFENSE 
Once the issue of self-defense is raised during the 
course of a criminal trial, whether by the defendant's or 
prosecution's evidence, it is the State's burden to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the killing was not in self-defense. 
Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. Thus, as the jury in this case was 
instructed (R. 85), a defendant is entitled to an acquittal if 
the evidence presented at trial creates a reasonable doubt as to 
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whether the defendant did or did not act in self-defense. J^ d. at 
215; State v. Jackson, 528 P.2d 145 (1974). 
The elements of self-defense as a justification for a 
killing are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1990): 
(1) A person is justified in threatening 
or using force against another when and to 
the extent that he reasonably believes that 
such force is necessary to defend himself or 
a third person against such other's imminent 
use of unlawful force; however, a person is 
justified in using force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury only if he reasonably believes that 
the force is necessary to prevent death or 
serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
person, or to prevent the commission of a 
forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using 
force under the circumstances specified in 
paragraph (1) of this section if he: 
(a) Initially provokes the use of force 
against himself with the intent to use 
force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm 
upon the assailant; or 
(b) Is attempting to commit, committing, 
or fleeing after the commission or 
attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in 
a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws 
from the encounter and effectively 
communicates to such other person his 
intent to do so and the other 
notwithstanding continues or threatens to 
continue the use of unlawful force. 
Under this statute, Appellant was justified in using deadly force 
only if an assault by Bertrand with unlawful force was imminent 
and only if she reasonably believed that deadly force was 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to her. 
Because there was some evidence presented at trial on which 
reasonable minds could differ over what Appellant actually 
believed, whether that belief was reasonable, and whether serious 
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bodily injury to her was imminent at the time she acted, the 
determination of whether she acted in self-defense was for the 
jury. State v. Law, 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324, 327 (1944). 
"Life is not so cheap that one may use weapons on another which 
are quite likely to cause death unless the danger of being 
overcome is so great as to justify their use. This is usually a 
question for the jury . . . ." Id. 
As noted above, the jury's determination that 
Appellant's killing of Bertrand was not justified by self-defense 
must be given great deference by this court on appellate review. 
Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. The jury's finding that 
Appellant did not act in self-defense cannot be disturbed on 
appeal if, after viewing the evidence and its inferences in a 
light favorable to the jury's finding, there is any evidence and 
its reasonable inferences from which the jury could have reached 
that finding beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gardner, 789 P.2d at 
289; Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. The appropriate inquiry on 
appeal from a jury verdict is not whether there is evidence that 
would have supported a contrary finding, as Appellant seems to 
argue, or whether the appellate court would have reached the same 
finding of no self-defense as the jury did based on the evidence 
before it. In re Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 95 (Utah 1985). 
It is clear from the verdict of guilty of second degree 
murder that the jury accepted the testimony of Dr. Grey and the 
blood stain analyst and disbelieved Appellant, rejecting her 
claim that she did not take affirmative action to stab Bertrand, 
but that he had merely collided with her and accidently impaled 
himself on the knife in her hand (T. 610-11). It is impossible 
to know which element of self-defense the jury found lacking as 
justification for Appellant's action in stabbing Bertrand, and 
there is a myriad of possibilities. Perhaps the jurors thought 
that her use of deadly force was unreasonably excessive in light 
of the minor injuries she had incurred, according to the doctor 
who examined her within a few hours of the choking incident and 
the head banging incident. Or perhaps the jury concluded that, 
although she was justified in arming herself with the knife, she 
was not justified in going after Bertrand and using it, a 
distinction ignored by Appellant. Although Appellant paints a 
simple picture of herself as an innocent woman defending her life 
from an abusive boyfriend, the jury looked at those assaultive 
physical encounters on the night of September 1, 1989, in 
conjunction with the circumstances immediately preceeding the 
fatal stabbing in order to determine her belief, the 
reasonableness of that belief, and the reasonableness of her act 
of stabbing Bertrand to defend herself. 
There is substantial evidence that would support a 
finding that any belief Appellant had, at the time of the 
stabbing, that she was in imminent danger of serious injury even 
after she armed herself with the 5" knife was not reasonable 
because: (a) Bertrand had let her go at Steeley's insistence 
during the last altercation on the stairs, which the jury could 
believe she had precipitated by going down the stairs and 
knocking or kicking the box from Bertrand's hands; (b) in 
addition to being armed, Appellant was not alone with Bertrand 
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but had a male third party present to intervene who had already 
done so verbally, with success; (c) the police had already been 
called and Appellant knew they were on their way; (d) before the 
incident on the stairs, Bertrand had gotten dressed, opened the 
garage door, taken his four-year-old out and put her into his 
pickup truck, and started packing up his belongings and put some 
in the back of the truck; (e) Appellant heard Bertrand ask 
Steeley in a normal voice to move his cab out of the driveway, 
presumably so he could back his truck out; (e) after the incident 
on the stairs, Bertrand did not pursue Appellant but instead went 
the opposite direction and starting picking up scattered toys to 
continue his departure from the house; and (f) there was no 
evidence of any action or threats by Bertrand to attack Appellant 
once he let her go on the steps. 
There is also substantial evidence from which the jury 
could have concluded that Appellant did not have any belief, 
reasonable or not, that deadly force was necessary because of 
imminent danger of serious bodily injury from Bertrand when she 
stabbed him. The jury could have instead concluded that she was 
not defending herself at all, but was acting offensively out of 
drunken anger: (a) she was a hothead whose temper was shorter 
when she had been drinking, and she was "pretty drunk" when she 
left Toponce's house at about 3:30 or 4:00 a.m., less than an 
hour before the stabbing, after splitting a bottle of rum; (b) 
she had in the past attacked Bertrand physically, even without 
provocation; (c) the tone of her call to the police, even though 
it was immediately after the choking incident, is not one of a 
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woman afraid for her life, but one of a smart aleck who is very 
angry at her boyfriend; (d) after she called the police and asked 
Steeley to stick around, and Steeley left the house to move his 
cab out of the driveway, she did not stay upstairs away from 
Bertrand, but instead went down to where he was and kicked the 
box of toys out of his hand, interrupting his departure and 
provoking the incident on the lower stairs, which is consistent 
with his yelling to Steeley, "Get her off of me"; (e) after she 
armed herself with the knife, she did not stand her ground to 
defend herself and wait for any further advance on her or attack 
(or for the arrival of the police), she ran down the stairs in 
pursuit of Bertrand, brandishing a knife and angrily yelling at 
him to threaten him, pursuing him down the stairs "to show him 
that he wasn't going to punch [her] around anymore" (T. 557) and 
becoming an aggressor; (f) when she encountered Bertrand coming 
around the corner of the steps, as she expected to (T. 558), she 
didn't just threaten him with the knife and tell him to stay 
away—she thrust the knife into and through his breast bone with 
enough force to go completely through his heart and sever his 
esophagus, after first striking him with the knife in a way that 
caused defensive wounds on the back of his right hand as he took 
action to protect himself. 
The jury could also have determined that Appellant's 
stabbing of Bertrand was affirmative conduct and not a defensive 
action by assessing her state of mind at the time, as evidenced 
by her own words and conduct during the stabbing and afterwards. 
Immediately after the stabbing, she did not react the way one 
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would reasonably expect from a woman who has, either accidently 
or out of fear in self-defense, delivered a mortal wound to a 
lover. When Bertrand cried out, "Oh God, she stabbed me," 
Petersen coldly responded, "Now leave." (T. 168). After Bertrand 
and the knife fell to the floor, she did not look to see how 
badly he was injured, or even call for any medical assistance 
(T.612). Instead, the stepped around Bertrand's bleeding body, 
went into the family room and got herself another beer. When she 
walked back by the body and emerged into the garage and met 
Officer Libbert, she calmly took a pull on her beer and told him 
in a slurred voice that she had had to defend herself because 
Bertrand was choking her. Then, consistently demonstrating anger 
instead of remorse about the stabbing, she makes a sarcastic 
comment to the officer about whether he wants to talk to her dog. 
Although told while still at her house that Bertrand was dead, 
she didn't even get worked about it about it until almost two 
hours after the stabbing—after she had been arrested and placed 
in a holding room before being booked for murder, after she had 
had enough time to sober up and contemplate her own future. 
When all of the evidence presented to the jury in this 
case and its reasonable inferences—not just Appellant's 
expurgated version—is viewed in a light favorable to the jury's 
verdict of guilty, it is apparent that the State met its burden 
of proof by presenting, not just some evidence, but substantial 
evidence on which the jury could find the following beyond a 
reasonable doubt: (1) that Appellant was guilty of second degree 
murder because she had killed Bertrand by stabbing him in the 
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chest with a 5" knife blade, an act clearly dangerous to human 
life, intending to cause him serious bodily injury, Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-203(1)(b); or (b) that she thereby knowingly engaged 
in conduct creating a grave risk of death to Bertrand, acting 
under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c); and (c) that her action in 
stabbing Bertrand in the chest, which resulted in his death, was 
not justified by self-defense. Accordingly, the court should 
reject on the merits Appellant's claim that the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the jury's finding of an absence 
of self-defense. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State requests that this 
court affirm the judgment of conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this &/k day of February, 1991. 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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